Texas Wesleyan Law Review
Volume 13

Issue 2

Article 18

3-1-2007

Somerset’s Case at the Bar: Securing the “Pure Air” of English
Jurisdiction Within the British Empire
Daniel J. Hulsebosch

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr

Recommended Citation
Daniel J. Hulsebosch, Somerset’s Case at the Bar: Securing the “Pure Air” of English Jurisdiction Within
the British Empire, 13 Tex. Wesleyan L. Rev. 699 (2007).
Available at: https://doi.org/10.37419/TWLR.V13.I2.17

This Essay is brought to you for free and open access by Texas A&M Law Scholarship. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Texas Wesleyan Law Review by an authorized editor of Texas A&M Law Scholarship. For more
information, please contact aretteen@law.tamu.edu.

Hulsebosch: Somerset’s Case at the Bar: Securing the “Pure Air” of English Ju

SOMERSET'S CASE AT THE BAR: SECURING
THE "PURE AIR" OF ENGLISH
JURISDICTION WITHIN THE
BRITISH EMPIRE
Daniel J. Hulseboscht
I.

SOMERSET AND THE HISTORY OF LIBERTY

How do we measure the importance of Somerset's Case-or any single legal decision? The answer will depend on why we ask the question. Thirty years ago in an important article, William Wiecek showed
how American abolitionists embraced Somerset, and papers throughout this conference have demonstrated that the case reverberated
throughout the United States for almost a century after Lord Mansfield uttered his cryptic opinion in Westminster Hall in 1772.1 Mansfield did not say anything about England's air quality, but James
Somerset's counsel did exclaim that England's air was too pure for a
slave to breathe. This line was at least two centuries old, dating back
to a hazily recorded case involving a Russian master who whipped his
serf in England in the 1560s. Because England had too pure an air for
a slave to breathe, the master could not beat his serf. The line was
revived at the outset of the English Civil War, when the House of
Commons impeached the judges of Star Chamber for whipping and
imprisoning John Lilburne for having published unlicensed books on
Puritanism. In fact, these civil war debates constitute the first written
reference to the Russian slave's case.2 The inference was that Star
Chamber had treated Lilburne like a slave. Parliament soon abolished the court, which was a subcommittee of the King's Privy Council. By the time Somerset's lawyers made their appearance at the bar
of King's Bench in 1772, English schoolboys had for a long time been
taught, among other lessons of Whig history-or English history as
t Professor, New York University School of Law. The Author thanks the participants at the conference, especially Cheryl Harris and William Wiecek, for their
comments and questions. Part of this essay is derived and excerpted from Daniel J.
Hulsebosch, Comment, Nothing But Liberty: Somerset's Case and the British Empire,
24 LAW & HIST. REV. 647 (2006).
1. See generally Ruth Paley, After Somerset: Mansfield, Slavery and the Law in
England, 1772-1830, in LAW, CRIME AND ENGLISH SOCIETY, 1660-1830, at 184
(Norma Landau ed., 2002) (discussing interpretations of Somerset in North America
before the Civil War); William M. Wiecek, Somerset: Lord Mansfield and the Legitimacy of Slavery in the Anglo-American World, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 86 (1974-75) (discussing the reception of Somerset in North America).
2. The Lilburne case, along with the legend of the Russian slave case, was memorialized in 2 JOHN RUSHWORTH, HISTORICAL COLLECTIONS FROM THE YEAR 1628 TO
THE YEAR 1638, at 344 (1706).
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the story of the progress of freedom-that their kingdom had too pure
an air for a slave to breathe.
This essay explores what this environmental conceit meant as a legal fact to the legal professionals involved in the case in 1772. It was
important to them. Many of us are also legal professionals, and the
case remains important to us. But the case meant something different
for them, who could not see the future, than it does today for us, who
see their future as our history. It is a mistake, then, to attribute too
much weight to this one legal decision-to read into Mansfield's opinion the whole history of liberation.
One reason it is wrong is that it gives new legs to an old conviction
about what Justice Felix Frankfurter liked to call "the notions of justice of English-speaking peoples," a group that Winston Churchill was
at the same time giving a history.4 At its most grand, tracing the abolition of slavery to Lord Mansfield's decision in Westminster in 1772
makes liberty seem like the peculiar property of Anglophones,
which-even if we could agree on the meaning of "liberty"-is
counterfactual. At the least, it makes Anglo-American liberty seem
the most perfect of its kind. But, historically, many nations have
trumpeted their abolitionist traditions.5 Some did so to gain moral
leverage over other nations, and collectively that international contest
among nations to present themselves as bastions of freedom might be
called "competitive liberty." The competitive liberty dynamic helped
spread abolitionism throughout the western world.6
Second, interpreting Somerset's Case as the germ of abolition does
not do justice to the actual legacies of English legal culture for the
former colonies of the British Empire. History lies in details rather
than in summary propositions, and the details cut in many directions
because there were so many people in so many places who made
claims under the banner of "the liberties of Englishmen." The focus
in Somerset's Case, as elsewhere, should be on how historical actors
used the discourse of liberty, instead of accepting the discourse as revealing something essential about a legal tradition or even this single
decision.
3. See generally H. BUTTERFIELD, THE WHIG INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY
(1951) (discussing Whig history).
4. See, e.g., Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 417 (1945) (Frankfurter, J.) (invoking "those canons of decency and fairness which express the notions of justice of
English-speaking peoples" to define the content of due process in criminal proceedings); see also WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES, 4 VOLS. (1956-58).

5. The French tradition is captured

in SUE PEABODY, "THERE ARE

No

SLAVES

IN FRANCE": THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF RACE AND SLAVERY IN THE ANCIEN Rt-

(1996).
6. See also

GIME

CHRISTOPHER LESLIE BROWN, MORAL CAPITAL: FOUNDATIONS OF
BRITISH ABOLITIONISM (2006) (discussing a similar form of argument about British

abolitionism).
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Sometimes, of course, there are good reasons for decontextualizing
a powerful utterance and then abstracting it into a general principle.
Again, Anglo-American abolitionism is a good example: The "pure
air" remark helped galvanize the movement. For abolitionists, lifting
that remark out of the context of the decision made it seem like the
principle of purity applied everywhere in the Anglophone world. Almost immediately, slaves and abolitionists throughout the British Empire interpreted the Somerset decision as abolishing slavery in
England and, possibly, as endangering slavery across the Empire.
That, however, is not how the legal professionals understood the proceedings in King's Bench in 1772. Instead, that expansive interpretation was the value added that antislavery advocates contributed to the
legal product that came to be known as Somerset's Case.7 We discount
the agency of those who came after Somerset's Case, as well as the
agency of the people involved in it, if we see them all as performing a
prescripted drama of liberty.
The focus here is on the meaning of the case for the legal professionals who argued and decided it. For example, in the years after
Somerset, Mansfield repeatedly stated that his decision did not end the
servitude of slaves in England and did not affect slavery anywhere else
in the British Empire. In Rex v. The Inhabitants of Thames Ditton,8
Mansfield held that slaves could not benefit from parish poor relief
because they were not hirelings, as the Poor Law required. When
counsel for the claimant raised Somerset's Case to support the argument that the pauper had been a servant rather than a slave, Mansfield interjected that the case went "no further than that the master
cannot by force compel him to go out of the country." 9 In the infamous 1783 case of the slave ship Zong,1 ° Mansfield and the rest of
King's Bench assumed that slaves were insurable goods for purposes
of an insurance contract sued on in London. In that case, a ship captain jettisoned slaves into the ocean, allegedly to save a leaky ship and
its crew. Faced with a large claim for lost slaves, the London insurers
objected that "[t]here is no instance in which the mortality of slaves
falls upon the underwriters, except in the cases of perils of the seas
and of enemies."'" Mansfield's decision allowed the slaveholders to
sue on the claim-to recover for the slaves as lost goods-and held
that under the contract they could be thrown off the ship if in fact it
was necessary to do so to save the ship. However, the court doubted
the necessity of jettisoning the slaves under the facts presented, and
7. Professor Wiecek long ago distinguished the decision in Somerset's Case from
its reception in antislavery circles (i.e., circles that he called "neo-Somerset"). See
Wiecek, supra note 1.
8. R. v. Inhabitants of Thames Ditton, (1785) 99 Eng. Rep. 891 (K.B.).
9. Id. at 892; see 2 JAMES OLDHAM, THE MANSFIELD MANUSCRIPTS AND THE
GROWTH OF ENGLISH LAW IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 1236 (1992).
10. Gregson v. Gilbert, (1783) 99 Eng. Rep. 629 (K.B.).
11. Id. at 629.
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the case was sent for retrial on the issue of necessity. 1 2 Still the myth
of Mansfield the liberator persists.
In addition, Somerset's own lawyers stated during argument that
slavery was "necessary" and was legal in the colonies. That fact was
central to their arguments for why it should not be recognized in England. As Edmund Morgan-and Hegel-saw long ago, slavery can
help define freedom. 1 3 English freedom was juxtaposed against colonial slavery, and the contrast was supposed to show more than a difference in labor systems. It also highlighted the balance of
governmental powers within England that preserved liberty, in contrast to the unbalanced executive and discretionary governments that,
English residents believed, characterized the colonies. Violent slaveholders, arbitrary colonial governments, and an unrestrained king: this
trinity of prerogative government was the dreaded specter that James
Somerset's attorneys raised when arguing that slavery could not exist
in England, at least not without the consent of Englishmen in Parliament. Since at least the Lilburne trial, slavery had been intertwined
with the specter of discretionary government. That connection was
central to the arguments at King's Bench in 1772.
Therefore, contrary to Whig or progressive interpretations of Somerset's Case, my claim is that the legal arguments in the case more
closely tracked an old discourse of English supremacy within the Brit14
ish Empire than the emerging language of natural or human rights.
Like most discourses, it reflected the past more than it controlled the
future and resonated primarily with its local audience: those in England in 1772 who were ambivalent about colonial slavery. Many
there probably found it "odious," as Mansfield called it, while at the
same time, like Mansfield, understood that it was essential for the imperial economy. The participants in Somerset's Case were most concerned to reconcile this tension: to keep slavery in the Empire while
keeping it out of England. They were engaged in Whig constitutionalism, to be sure, but it was not twenty-first century Whig
constitutionalism.
For almost two centuries before the case, the English constitution
had been constructed by contrasting English legal liberties to those
available elsewhere, including in other jurisdictions in the Empire.15
This intra-imperial politics of comparison was related to the competitive liberty between kingdoms and can be called "constitutional alter12. Id. at 630. The case led to a legislative backlash, as the British Parliament
soon declared that slaves were not goods for this purpose. See F.O. SHYLLON, BLACK
SLAVES IN BRITAIN 205 (1974).
13. See G.W.F. HEGEL, PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT 111-19 (A.V. Miller trans.,
1977); EDMUND S. MORGAN, AMERICAN SLAVERY, AMERICAN FREEDOM: THE
ORDEAL OF COLONIAL VIRGINIA (1975).
14. This paragraph is excerpted and derived from Hulsebosch, supra note t, at
648.
15. This paragraph is derived from Hulsebosch, supra note t, at 648.
702
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ity." This juxtaposition emerged among people who wanted the gains
and glory of imperial expansion but also feared that royal dominions
abroad would be training grounds for arbitrary government-royal
executive government-that might travel back home. 6 The tragic
endpoint of this reverse migration was called "slavery." From the beginning of colonization, this was a popular fear. Executive officials
might bring back royalist innovations in their mental baggage of colonial administration; plantation masters might bring it back physically,
with their slaves. Returning planters created a problem-the practice
of slavery in England-and were symbols of a greater problem-they
personified despotism in their treatment of slaves and the way the
powerful West India lobby used its wealth to obtain the king's support
for that oppression.
Therefore, when the lawyers and judges in Somerset's Case spoke of
slavery, they spoke not only about the liberty of James Somerset and
others who looked like him; they also expressed concern for the liberties of Englishmen.1 7 Seen in this light, the decision left the institution
of colonial slavery almost untouched while at the same time insulating
England from slavery, the power of returning West Indian planters,
and despotism.
II.

IMPERIAL CONFLICT-OF-LAWS

The lawyers' arguments in the case-which are voluminous, especially when compared to Mansfield's telegraphic opinion-demonstrate that Somerset's lawyers distinguished between colonial and
English law. The argument that there was a single law of slavery
throughout the Empire rarely got traction. Counsel for Stewart, the
slave holder, invoked a 1729 opinion of the king's attorney general
and solicitor general, known as the Yorke-Talbot opinion, which was
obtained by the West Indian lobby. The opinion stated that Christian
conversion did not emancipate slaves and that planters could bring
slaves from the colonies to England and still hold them as slaves."'
Mansfield, however, thought that this opinion had little authority in
Somerset's Case because it was designed primarily to negate the claim
that Christian conversion sufficed to liberate a slave, an assertion long
settled in the negative by 1772. In addition, it was procured "after
dinner" at the inns. 19 It was not part of a legal case or part of the
formal proceedings of the inn. Instead, Mansfield told the lawyers for
the slaveholder that only the British Parliament could legislate such
law for the Empire. Meanwhile, English air was breathed in England
16. See DAVID ARMITAGE, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE
125-45 (2000).
17. This paragraph is excerpted from Hulsebosch, supra note t, at 648.
18. Edward Fiddes, Lord Mansfield and the Sommersett Case, 50 L.Q. REV. 499,
501-02 (1934).
19. Id. at 502.
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alone; Virginian air in Virginia. So the lawyers were dealing with what
we now call the conflict of laws: how courts in the forum of dispute
decide cases that turn on rights created under another jurisdiction's
law.
The dialogue about this problem shows consensus on the general
rule, derived from the law of nations, of lex loci: The forum court
should recognize a person's status created under the law of the jurisdiction where the legal relation at issue arose. 20 They assumed that a
status like servitude translated from one legal system to another. But
the court also "approved" of a conventional limitation on this rule:
While a forum's court should recognize a status created in foreign jurisdictions, it need not recognize municipal regulations of the incidents of that status that were considered "inconvenient" or penal in
the forum jurisdiction. Mansfield raised the case of marriage, which
remains the classic example of how the conflict of laws operates. A
marriage was recognized everywhere, but the incidents of marriage,
such as parent's power to discipline children, varied. 21 Under the limited decision in this case, Stewart remained Somerset's master. But
the incidents of that relationship, like the power to command and discipline, were different in England than in Virginia. As Mansfield said,
"So high an act of dominion"-meaning detention and deportation
that characterized slavery rather than servitude itself-"must be recognized by the law of the country where it is used."2 2 Nothing but
"positive law" could support those "odious" practices. 23 Consequently, King's Bench was prepared to recognize the status of servitude but not the full power of control that marked colonial slavery.2 4
The law of nations, Somerset's counsel argued, gave the Court another way out: It could disregard the colonial status altogether as being "inconvenient" under English law. z5 The Court refused to do so.
Mansfield seems to have felt that he could not disregard that status
because it arose in a royal dominion rather than a truly "foreign"
country. A conflict between the law of two kingdoms was different
from a conflict between two royal territories loyal to the same king.2 6
This distinction helped neutralize the comparative law examples that
20. This paragraph is excerpted and derived from Hulsebosch, supra note t, at
650-51.
21. Somerset v. Sterwart, (1772) 98 Eng. Rep. 499, 504 (K.B.).
22. Id. at 510.
23. Id.
24. The continuation of servitude followed from the limited decision itself. Mansfield clarified this part of the decision afterward. See OLDHAM, supra note 9, at 1238.
25. This paragraph is excerpted and derived from Hulsebosch, supra note t, at
652-53.
26. Mansfield distinguished the French case from this one: there, "France was not
bound to judge by the municipal laws of Spain; nor was to take cognizance of the
offences supposed against that law." Somerset, 98 Eng. Rep. at 502. Here, by contrast, there was a closer relationship between the laws of England and those of the
colonies.
704
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Somerset's attorneys raised of slaves being emancipated when
brought from one kingdom to another that did not recognize slavery.
In a remark that was not repeated often in the nineteenth century,
Mansfield doubted whether the mere relocation of a master and his
slave from one royal territory to another was enough to emancipate
the slave fully.2 7 He also spoke of British parliamentary legislation
that protected slave masters when they transferred their slaves from
one place to another within the British Empire.2 8 Parliament could
pass any law about slavery. So far, it had protected the transportation
of slaves across the Empire but had not legalized all the incidents of
slavery in England.
If colonies were different from foreign kingdoms, why not recognize
the incidents of their master-servant relations too? For Somerset's
lawyers, the answer turned on England's place in the Empire and the
nature of English government.
In his argument, Francis Hargrave warned that the full incidents of
slavery in England 2would
"revive" the other "mischiefs" connected to
"utter servitude." 9 Those mischiefs were governmental and
threatened what he called England's "mild and just" constitution.
Driving home the point, Hargrave asked, "In England, where freedom
is the grand object of the laws, and dispensed to the meanest individual, shall the laws of an infant colony, Virginia, or of a barbarous nation, Africa, prevail?" 3 ° His colleague John Alleyne picked up the
theme, asking the court to "preserve that liberty by which we are distinguished by all the earth." 31 Allowance of slavery was an evil in
itself, but he expressed even more fear of what might follow in its
train: "The horrid cruelties, scarce credible in recital, perpetrated in
America, might, by the allowance of slaves amongst us, be introduced
here."3 2 He used the example of corporal punishment. Social historians know, as these lawyers must have known, that physical discipline
was still central to labor relations in England. But some kinds of punishment separated the slave from the servant. Whipping was one
bright line. Alleyne conjured the specter of masters whipping slaves
in the fields of London. What would happen if Englishmen got used
to that sort of violence? He warned of gradual political slavery in
England, as the incidents of the institution, he said, "might by time

27. He used the example of a slave leaving Virginia to "the adjacent country,
where there are no slaves, if change to a place of contrary custom was sufficient," and
implied that this was not sufficient. Id. at 504.
28. Id.
29. This paragraph is excerpted and derived from Hulsebosch, supra note t, at
655-56.
30. Somerset, 98 Eng. Rep. at 501 (Hargrave).
31. Id. at 503 (Alleyne) (emphasis added).
32. Id. (Alleyne).

Published by Texas A&M Law Scholarship, 2022

7

Texas Wesleyan Law Review, Vol. 13 [2022], Iss. 2, Art. 18

TEXAS WESLEYAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13

become familiar, [and] become unheeded by this nation., 3 3 Denying
the West Indians of their colonial prerogatives while in England
would fortify the barrier against a despotic government.
It appears that Mansfield agreed. His decision offered a modus
vivendi that kept slavery alive but abroad, while also signaling to Parliament that legislation was needed.
That signal was important not because Parliament responded: In the
short run, it did not. But instead, it was important because this signal-along with other cases decided about the same time-reflected
Mansfield's desire to make the House of Commons and the commonlaw courts the center of imperial governance at the expense of the
king and Privy Council, colonial governors, and the West India lobby.
Call this fuller program "Westminster Hall Supremacy." 34
Most of us have heard of parliamentary supremacy. Mansfield was
a vocal proponent of it.3 5 There is little doubt that Mansfield would
have enforced a parliamentary statute that recognized black slavery in
England. The polestar of eighteenth-century Whig constitutionalism
was parliamentary government. The modern American polestar is individual rights. The English Whigs feared executive despotism; many
liberal lawyers now fear legislative despotism-though old fears of executive government are being revived on both sides of the Atlantic.
My argument is that the fear of executive power that drove the
House of Commons to its central place in the English constitution also
animated lawyers at the other end of Westminster Hall. If we were to
fit Somerset in with other cases of the same era, it would not find
much abolitionist company. Instead, Somerset fits better with a handful of other cases either arising in the colonies or involving the status
of colonial law in England. Arguments in those decisions, and Mansfield's handling of them, reflected a fear of unrestrained royal or executive power and a corresponding jealous protection of both common
law and parliamentary jurisdiction.
III.

MANSFIELD'S IMPERIAL JURISPRUDENCE

By definition, the jurisdiction of the common-law courts of England
was restricted to the realm of England. The power to review Irish
decisions was a statutory exception. The common lawyers, however,
had gradually reached out to grab some maritime actions and foreign
transitory contract cases. Using a pleading fiction that a case arising
33. Id. at 503 (Alleyne). For social histories of master-servant relationships in the
British world, see MASTERS, SERVANTS, AND MAGISTRATES IN BRITAIN AND THE EMPIRE, 1562-1955 (Douglas Hay & Paul Craven eds., 2004).
34. The Author is developing this argument in a paper entitled "Westminster Hall
Supremacy" (copy on file with author).
35. See DANIEL J. HULSEBOSCH, CONSTITUTING EMPIRE: NEW YORK AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE ATLANTIC WORLD, 1664-1830, at
138 (2005).
706
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on the high seas or, for example, in Paris actually arose in Cheapside
London, the courts handled such cases whenever it had personal jurisdiction over both parties. This procedure had long helped Mansfield
incorporate the law merchant into the common law. The innovation
in the 1770s was to extend this jurisdictional fiction beyond these private commercial cases to tort cases with public-law dimensions.
Lord Mansfield never clearly articulated the jurisdictional elements
necessary for a case arising in the colonies to be heard in King's
Bench. As far as personal jurisdiction, it appears that the parties had
to be located in England when the suit commenced.3 6 As for subject
matter jurisdiction, it appears that such a case had to possess a publiclaw dimension, such as suits by royal subjects against royal governors.
In sum, the status of being a subject of the king and present in England gave the English court jurisdiction, while the fact that the action
arose from the malfeasance of the king's representatives in an overseas dominion made the case one that warranted jurisdiction. But this
jurisdictional analysis remains a surmise based on only two cases decided in the two years after Somerset's Case: Fabrigasv. Mostyn (K.B.
1773) 37 and Campbell v. Hall (K.B. 1774).38
Fabrigasv. Mostyn was a tort suit by a royal subject for assault and
unlawful detention against the colonial governor-general of the island
of Minorca. The banished Minorquin made his way to London and
sued the governor for damages in the court of Common Pleas. A jury
awarded
him an astounding 3,000 pounds in damages, along with
39
costs.

On review, the governor's attorney argued that King's Bench had
no jurisdiction over injuries sustained abroad. Mansfield vigorously
defended his Court's jurisdiction: if it did not have jurisdiction, then
the plaintiff could not get a remedy:
[T]o lay down in an English Court of Justice such a monstrous proposition, as that a governor acting by virtue of letters patent under
the Great Seal, is accountable only to God, and his own conscience;
that he is absolutely despotic, and can spoil, plunder, and affect His
Majesty's subjects, both in their liberty and property, with impunity,
is a doctrine that cannot be maintained."
The only alternative was the Privy Council, which Mansfield claimed
had only the power to fire the governor, not to grant damageswhich, generally, was not accurate."a Mansfield argued that the Privy
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Mostyn v. Fabrigas, (1773) 96 Eng. Rep. 1021 (K.B.).
Id.
Campbell v. Hall, (1774) 98 Eng. Rep. 1045 (K.B.).
Mostyn, 96 Eng. Rep. at 1022.
Id. at 1029.
Id.; see also JOSEPH HENRY SMITH, APPEALS TO THE PRIVY COUNCIL FROM
THE AMERICAN PLANTATIONS (1950) (discussing the Privy Council review of colonial
cases where the colony had an established court system).
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Council offered no adequate remedy because the governor was essentially the agent of the Privy Council. It was, therefore, not a disinterested judge of the governor's behavior. This logic undermined the
whole basis of imperial administration, which historically flowed from
the Privy Council. It also previewed metropolitan debates in the next
decade over civil service reform that gradually led to greater parliamentary regulation over the colonies-again, giving more power to
Westminster Hall.4 2
The second issue in Fabrigas was whether the governor's action
should be judged under Minorquin law or English law. The answer
was Minorquin law, which had to be proved as a question of fact to
the jury.4 3 In practice, this meant that the jury would decide what
duty the governor owed the private subject. Apparently they decided
that the governor could not banish the plaintiff without trial.
The next case, Campbell v. Hall, involved a trespass action in which
a taxpayer sought the return of a tax paid to the royal governor of
Grenada. The case turned on the legality of a tax levied by the governor without the consent of Grenada's assembly. The governor levied
the tax just after the colony had been taken from France and before
there was a Grenadian assembly. Again, a subject sued the colonial
governor in Westminster. This time there was little need to discuss the
jurisdictional question, which seemed settled in Fabrigas. On the merits, Mansfield held that in two royal proclamations, the King had
pledged to rule Granada with the consent of the governed 4 4-therefore, no taxation without representation. However, Mansfield also
said that taxation by the British Parliament was also permissible. In
other words, he subscribed to the idea of virtual representation. The
point, again, was to restrain the King and his Privy Council rather
than offer individual overseas freeholders the right to veto taxes.
In sum, these cases, decided along with Somerset during the 1770s,
appear to be part of a constitutional agenda to vault Westminster Hall
to the top of imperial government. The loser was less the colonists in
the abstract-about whom Mansfield worried little-than King
George III and his ministers.
IV.

CONCLUSION

There is no question that James Somerset's habeas corpus proceedings reflected hostility to chattel slavery. But the arguments aired in
King's Bench reflected at least as much hostility to unrestrained exec42. See C.A. BAYLY, IMPERIAL MERIDIAN: THE BRITISH EMPIRE AND THE
1780-1830 (1989); ELIGA H. GOULD, THE PERSISTENCE OF EMPIRE (2000)
(discussing Parliamentary reform of imperial administration in the late eighteenth
century).
43. The trial judge pointed out that a defense under Minorquin law should have
been pleaded specially, but was not. Mostyn, 98 Eng. Rep. at 1027.
44. Campbell v. Hall, (1774) 98 Eng. Rep. 1045, 1045-47, 1050 (K.B.).
708
WORLD
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utive government. In those arguments and in the decision, the legal
professionals were leveraging their constitutional identity as Englishmen against what they saw as the despotic legal cultures of the overseas royal territories. This leveraging of identity was related to, but
not just in the service of, the claim of one slave in London not to be
sent to the deadly sugar plantations of Jamaica and the desire of abolitionists like Granville Sharp to get the courts involved in the struggle
against slavery. As throughout the constitutionalism of the Englishspeaking peoples, interests converged: The Whiggish aspirations of
common lawyers served the partial liberation of black slaves in
England.
What then was the importance of Somerset's Case? Instead of seeing it as a key source of the law of liberty, perhaps we can see it,
historically, as a product of a complicated constitutional structure in
which claims of authority were always uncertain and contested. In
that morass of conflicting jurisdictions called the British Empire, some
institutions were always seeking supremacy but almost none ever
wanted to make the whole space subject to one uniform law. This
jostling for supremacy, while leaving diversity, created much room in
which legal professionals and others could negotiate their identity.
People in the twenty-first century are not being anachronistic when
they read this case as a drama of identity politics. But the identity
politics of the 1770s were not modern identity politics. Then, identity
politics turned on jurisdictional lines within an empire.
Perhaps they still do. Where are the lines legal professionals try to
draw today? What are lawyers and historians doing when they locate
the germ of abolitionism in the stray remarks of lawyers and judges in
Westminster Hall in 1772? What are they trying to say about their
constitutional tradition, and what are they claiming for their
profession?
Whatever Somerset's Case reveals about the history of liberty, it
does offer a good example of a prominent tradition of the Englishspeaking peoples: the deft alternation between jurisdictional and jurisprudential conceptions of liberty. Historically, some Anglo-Americans have slipped effortlessly between describing a rule or practice in
one particular place and abstracting it as a rule that should guide behavior in many places. They rarely declare a rule to be "universal" or
"natural." They are more comfortable with an intermediate level of
generalization, such as calling a rule part of a constitutional principle
or essential to constitutionalism, terms that shift between place and
placelessness, history and timelessness. Alternatively, others have
struggled to defend those jurisdictional lines-to separate a province
from a nation, for example, and a nation from an empire. Either strategy-abstraction on the one hand or delineation and specification on
the other-can be used to further interests and ideas, to decide cases
and to create identity. Many people engage in both moves at thg09
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same time. Placing the arguments of legal professionals, such as those
who argued Somerset's Case, in historical context can help us see
which moves were occurring where, when, and why. Perhaps that historical understanding can, in turn, supply comparative perspective
that will help illuminate the work that legal arguments do today, including the work accomplished by arguments about legal history.
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